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DISAGREEING OVER AGREEMENTS:
A CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF
NO-POACHING AGREEMENTS IN
THE FRANCHISE SECTOR
Catherine E. Schaefer*
In October 2016, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division announced
its intent to proceed criminally against parties to no-poaching agreements,
or agreements between or among employers not to hire each other’s workers.
Consequently, a wave of class action antitrust lawsuits has raised questions
about the legality of no-poaching or no-hire provisions that certain
franchised food businesses use. Fast-food restaurant chains, including
McDonald’s, Carl’s Jr., and Pizza Hut, have recently found themselves
embroiled in such litigation. This Note examines prior antitrust litigation
involving no-poaching agreements between companies and discusses the
differences and similarities between these cases and the cases involving
franchised businesses. In analyzing the key issues that courts must confront
to resolve current and future cases specific to franchises, this Note proposes
that courts should employ a per se rule against no-poaching agreements
among franchisors and franchisees.
INTRODUCTION................................................................................ 2286
I. SHERMAN ACT SECTION 1: A PRIMER........................................ 2290
A. Restraints of Trade ......................................................... 2290
B. Threshold Questions ....................................................... 2292
C. The Single-Entity Defense: A Sherman Act Section 1
Exemption ..................................................................... 2293
1. History and Evolution of the Single-Entity
Doctrine ................................................................... 2293
2. Current Applicability to No-Poaching Franchise
Cases ....................................................................... 2295
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Fordham University School of Law; M.P.S., 2017, Cornell
University; B.A., 2009, Wellesley College. I am grateful to Aditi Bagchi for her guidance and
the editors and staff of the Fordham Law Review for their hard work and editing. A special
thanks to my partner Fran for her unwavering love and support, and my family, particularly
my parents and sister, for their encouragement. Without the groundbreaking work of Alan B.
Krueger, this Note would not have been possible. Rest in peace, Professor Krueger.

2285

2286

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

D. Modes of Analysis .......................................................... 2296
II. A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF NO-POACHING
ANTITRUST CASES ............................................................... 2297
A. Development of Antitrust Scrutiny of No-Poaching
Agreements ................................................................... 2298
B. Case Study: In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust
Litigation ...................................................................... 2299
1. Factual Background and Nature of the
Agreements Made ................................................... 2299
2. Labor-Economics Perspective and Restraint on
Labor Markets ......................................................... 2300
III. ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO NO-POACHING
AGREEMENTS IN THE FRANCHISE SECTOR........................... 2301
A. Comparison of No-Poaching Agreements in
Franchised and Unfranchised Industries ..................... 2301
B. Case Study: Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC ....... 2303
C. Other Recent Relevant Cases ......................................... 2305
D. Validity of Recent Complaints ........................................ 2307
1. Defenses and Pro-Competitive Justifications .......... 2307
2. Economic and Social Policy Considerations ........... 2308
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR CURRENT AND FUTURE FRANCHISE
CASES ................................................................................... 2309
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 2311
INTRODUCTION
According to a 2018 study conducted by Jobvite,1 82 percent of workers
in the United States are currently seeking new job opportunities.2 Yet, to
seamlessly switch jobs is not feasible for all employees in the U.S. job
market. Imagine for a moment that you are a manager at a McDonald’s
franchise. Every day you travel to work by bus, but your shift routinely runs
so late that you miss the last bus home, leaving you no choice but to walk
five miles home. After being promised, yet passed up for, promotion after
promotion, you finally decide to apply for a job at a different McDonald’s
closer to your home. However, you are barred from this opportunity because
of the franchise’s rule against intracompany hiring. This is the reality that

1. Jobvite is a recruiting and software corporation. See We Eat, Sleep, and Think About
Recruiting, JOBVITE, https://www.jobvite.com/company/ [https://perma.cc/3UPC-J8JH] (last
visited Mar. 15, 2019).
2. 2018 Job Seeker Nation Study: Researching the Candidate-Recruiter Relationship,
JOBVITE (2018), http://www.jobvite.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/2018_Job_Seeker_
Nation_Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6AT-HVFG].
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workers in the fast-food industry, such as Leinani Deslandes, must endure.3
In 2017, Deslandes filed a class action complaint alleging that the nosolicitation and no-hiring agreement4 between and among McDonald’s USA,
LLC, McDonald’s Corporation, and their franchisees is a violation of section
1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.5
While employers can only take limited measures to restrict competition in
the labor market,6 some employers, like McDonald’s, have been able to take
advantage of no-poaching agreements.7 No-poaching or no-hire agreements
are agreements between or among employers not to hire each other’s
workers.8 Deslandes alleged in her complaint that these agreements are
intended to prohibit other franchisees from hiring away their employees.9
Additionally, these agreements may restrict competition for potential
employees between franchisees and company-owned stores in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.10
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) reserves criminal antitrust
prosecutions for horizontal, per se agreements, which include price-fixing
and market-allocation agreements.11 In October 2016, the DOJ Antitrust
Division announced its intention to proceed criminally against those engaged
in naked no-poaching and wage-fixing agreements.12 These cases,
particularly in the fast-food industry, raise additional questions about
mobility restriction and wage suppression in already low-wage industries.13

3. Rachel Abrams, Why Aren’t Paychecks Growing? A Burger-Joint Clause Offers a
Clue, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/business/paygrowth-fast-food-hiring.html [https://perma.cc/WT9Y-7R2A].
4. See Michael Lindsay et al., Employers Beware: The DOJ and FTC Confirm That
Naked Wage-Fixing and “No-Poaching” Agreements Are Per Se Antitrust Violations,
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2016, at 1, 1 n.2.
5. See Amended Class Action Complaint ¶ 1, Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No.
17-4857, 2018 WL 3105955 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2017), ECF No. 32 [hereinafter Deslandes
Complaint].
6. Michael Lindsay & Katherine Santon, No Poaching Allowed: Antitrust Issues in
Labor Markets, 26 ANTITRUST, Summer 2012, at 73, 73–74.
7. David K. Haase & Darren M. Mungerson, Agreements Between Employers Not to Hire
Each Other’s Employees: When Are They Enforceable?, 21 LAB. LAW. 277, 277 (2006); see
also Lindsay et al., supra note 4, at 1 n.2.
8. See Lindsay et al., supra note 4, at 1 n.2. “No-poaching agreements are also called
no-hire, no-interference, non-solicitation, or no-switching agreements, depending on the
circumstances.” Id. This Note uses the terms “no-poaching” and “no-hire” interchangeably.
9. Paul M. Eckles et al., Spotlight on No-Poach Agreements Continues, Expands to New
Industries, SKADDEN ARPS SLATE MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2018/10/spotlight-on-no-poach-agreementscontinues [https://perma.cc/V7JC-8KZU].
10. Id.; see also Rochella T. Davis, Talent Can’t Be Allocated: A Labor Economics
Justification for No-Poaching Agreement Criminality in Antitrust Regulation, 12 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 279, 282 (2018).
11. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL III-12 (5th ed. 2018).
12. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE
PROFESSIONALS 3 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
992623/ftc-doj_hr_guidance_final_10-20-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/7W63-ZX4R].
13. See ALAN B. KRUEGER & ERIC A. POSNER, A PROPOSAL FOR PROTECTING LOW-INCOME
WORKERS FROM MONOPSONY AND COLLUSION, HAMILTON PROJECT 4 (2018),
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In the franchise context, these practices stifle the labor market and prevent
workers from achieving their full earnings.14
The question remains whether no-poaching agreements are ancillary to
franchise agreements or are illegal under the Sherman Act.15 Furthermore,
if a franchise system is not exempt from section 1 despite technically being
a single corporate entity, can it then demonstrate legitimate business goals
for wage suppression and similar anticompetitive behavior?16 The answers
to these questions are not obvious, in part due to disagreements among legal
scholars and economists over the overarching purpose of U.S. antitrust laws.
Some argue that proscribing private power, rather than promoting
efficiencies, is the primary impetus behind American antitrust laws.17 This
distrust of private power is the “one central and common ground that over
time has unified support for antitrust statutes.”18 Conversely, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC)—an executive agency responsible for enforcing
antitrust laws—states that the purpose of U.S. antitrust laws is to “promote
vigorous competition and protect consumers from anticompetitive mergers
and business practices.”19
In the no-poaching context, Joseph Harrington, professor of business
economics and public policy at the Wharton School, has stated that in terms
of suppressing competition, “companies agreeing not to compete for each
other’s employees is the same as companies agreeing not to compete for each
other’s customers.”20 Professor Harrington goes on to say that, “[i]n the
latter case, it results in customers paying higher prices because of the lack of
competition, and in the former case it results in workers receiving lower
wages because of the lack of competition.”21 The solution to the no-poaching

http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/protecting_low_income_workers_from_monops
ony_collusion_krueger_posner_pp.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS8N-SMU6].
14. Letter from Senators Elizabeth Warren and Cory A. Booker to Jeff Sessions, U.S.
Att’y Gen. 2 (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.scribd.com/document/365092277/2017-11-21Letter-to-Sessions-on-No-Poach-Agreements [https://perma.cc/DR8L-P22J].
15. Barbara T. Sicalides & A. Christopher Young, Fast-Food Chains Agree to End
Franchise No-Poach Restrictions, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (July 13, 2018),
https://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/fast-food-chains-agree-to-end-franchise-no-poachrestrictions-2018-07-13/ [https://perma.cc/485S-Q5QL].
16. KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 4–5.
17. See Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1153 (1981).
18. Id.
19. Guide to Antitrust Laws, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/R5AH-JRLR] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019); see
also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (“Taken as a whole, the
legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of competition, not
competitors . . . .”). See generally Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2253 (2013) (discussing the Court’s shift of emphasis from competition to consumer
welfare and evaluating other prominent antitrust propositions).
20. Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case: The Growing Debate Over Employee Mobility,
WHARTON U. PA. (Apr. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case],
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/silicon-valleys-poaching-case-growing-debateemployee-mobility/ [https://perma.cc/S2GC-52B2].
21. Id.
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issue in franchise systems, therefore, turns on which interests ought to be
promoted and protected.
This Note addresses antitrust issues with respect to no-poaching
agreements by exploring the economic impact of these types of agreements
in the Silicon Valley technology industry, where gentlemen’s agreements, or
anti-poaching and wage-fixing agreements, have become common practice
among U.S. employers.22 A recent study reveals that no-poaching
agreements are similarly common in the franchise sector, particularly in the
fast-food industry, which raises a host of issues regarding their legality.23
This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides a historical and legal
backdrop of antitrust law and describes the basic principles of a violation
under section 1 of the Sherman Act—including the different categorizations
of trade restraints—and the methods courts use to analyze alleged violations.
Part II then discusses the history of no-poaching agreements. This
discussion includes a detailed analysis of In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust
Litigation,24 which provides a contemporary exemplar of how no-poaching
agreements in the unfranchised technology industry impede competition by
artificially suppressing wages and restraining employee mobility.
Using the analysis outlined in Part II, Part III demonstrates how nopoaching agreements in the franchise sector,25 such as the one at issue in
Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC,26 differ from unfranchised industries
with respect to legal, economic, and public policy perspectives. Part III also
shows how no-poaching agreements in the franchise sector produce
anticompetitive effects similar to the agreements used in unfranchised
industries. It addresses the defenses franchisors proffer and the technically
vertical arrangements involved; yet Part III argues that these
characterizations should not be dispositive in the antitrust analysis.
Finally, Part IV further argues that, depending on the nature of the
agreement, and the amount of coordination and control involved in the
franchise system, no-poaching agreements in the franchise industry are akin
to horizontal customer-allocation agreements and that no-poaching
agreements interfere with competition in the labor market in many of the
same ways. As a result, courts should consider these types of agreements to
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See Alan B. Krueger & Orley Ashenfelter, Theory and Evidence on Employer
Collusion in the Franchise Sector, IZA INST. LAB. ECON. 2–4 (July 2018),
http://ftp.iza.org/dp11672.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC4D-QTAV]; see also How Fair—or
Legal—Are Non-Poaching Agreements?, WHARTON U. PA. (July 17, 2018),
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/how-fair-or-legal-are-non-poaching-agreements/
[https://perma.cc/33HX-NAUU].
24. 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2012); see infra Part II.B (providing an in-depth
analysis of the types of agreements made by technology companies).
25. Other franchised industries under scrutiny include hotels, convenience stores, and the
following services: car repair, home health care, cleaning, tax preparation, parcel, electronic
repair, child care, custom window covering, travel, and insurance adjustment. See Eckles et
al., supra note 9.
26. No. 17-4857, 2018 WL 3105955 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018); see infra Part III.B (using
Deslandes as a case study for the effects of no-poaching agreements in a franchised system).
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be per se illegal and look at the actual harm to employees rather than the
technically vertical and single-entity designations of the companies that
employ them.27
I. SHERMAN ACT SECTION 1: A PRIMER
This Part outlines basic antitrust law concepts and definitions, as well as
principles specific to section 1 of the Sherman Act. Part I.A begins with an
introduction to restraints of trade and the different categorizations of
restraints. Part I.B introduces the two threshold questions associated with a
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Part I.C describes the single-entity
defense as an exemption to a section 1 violation and details its applicability
to franchises with a focus on the current legal doctrine. Finally, Part I.D
reviews the three different modes of analysis that federal courts use to
determine whether an agreement unreasonably restrains trade.
A. Restraints of Trade
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that “[e]very contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal.”28 In other words, the Sherman Act prohibits competitors from
entering into agreements with one another that would restrain competition.29
Although most claims under section 1 involve the restraint of trade in product
markets, section 1 also applies to restraints of trade in labor markets.30 In the
labor market, employers are purchasers and employees are sellers of labor.31
In the October 2016 Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource
Professionals, the DOJ averred that it will continue to criminally pursue per
se violations of section 1.32 At the same time, it announced it would begin
to characterize no-poaching agreements as per se violations.33 Naked
horizontal agreements, which include agreements among competitors to fix
prices or to divide markets, are per se unlawful.34 The DOJ also characterizes
27. See infra notes 41–47 and accompanying text (discussing vertical—as opposed to
horizontal—restraints and the single-entity defense).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). Passed by Congress in 1890, the Sherman Act was the first
antitrust law—a “comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade.” Guide to Antitrust Laws: The Antitrust Laws,
FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrustlaws [https://perma.cc/BCQ8-LQK8] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
29. Davis, supra note 10, at 284.
30. Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really Any Different from Illegal
Group Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally Restrains
Trade, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 631, 639 (2009).
31. See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT & T Corp, 248 F.3d 131, 140–41 (3d Cir. 2001)
(acknowledging that the labor market is a market for antitrust purposes).
32. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, supra note 12, at 3; see also Davis, supra note 10, at 288.
33. Davis, supra note 10, at 288.
34. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007);
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 434–36 (1990) (explaining that a
horizontal agreement among lawyers to refuse to represent criminal defendants until their fees
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naked no-poaching agreements as per se violations, and it therefore intends
to prosecute these types of agreements criminally.35
Courts will find a violation of section 1 if a no-poaching agreement
(1) serves no legitimate purpose, or (2) serves a legitimate business purpose
but is not narrowly tailored to its purpose.36 Conversely, courts will evaluate
the nature of the restraint if it is ancillary as opposed to naked.37 Ancillary
restraints are “those that are part of a larger endeavor whose success they
promote.”38 For example, a restraint is ancillary if it is reasonably necessary
to achieve increased productivity and output.39 Ancillary restraints, unlike
naked restraints, are analyzed under the rule of reason and typically survive
this analysis.40
Another distinction is whether the restraint is horizontal or vertical.
Whether the restraint is horizontal—among companies competing at the
same level of the production and distribution process—or vertical—between
companies competing at different levels—has been a key issue because
courts almost invariably apply the per se rule to horizontal agreements.41 A
horizontal agreement not to hire competitors’ employees is an example of
market division.42 Thus, the DOJ has warned employers that it considers
naked horizontal no-poaching agreements per se unlawful.43
However, not all horizontal restraints are per se illegal.44 A court must
distinguish between “naked” and “ancillary” restraints because this
distinction determines which analytical test will be applied to the restraint.45
Some horizontal restraints are considered ancillary if they are procompetitive, especially when they increase efficiency.46 For instance, nopoaching agreements that are ancillary to the sale of a business can have proincreased was a naked restraint and per se unlawful); infra notes 100–02 and accompanying
text (describing, in detail, the per se rule of illegality).
35. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, supra note 12, at 1–2.
36. See Mark L. Krotoski & Richard G. S. Lee, DOJ Antitrust Division Announces
Imminent Criminal Prosecution for ‘No Poaching’ Agreements, MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS
LLP (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/doj-antitrust-division-announcesimminent-criminal-prosecution-for-no-poaching-agreements [https://perma.cc/5G7G-GEL9].
37. See In re Wholesale Grocery Prods. Antitrust Litig., 722 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1093–94
(D. Minn. 2010) (“Determining whether an agreement is ancillary requires a court to consider
whether, at the time the agreement was made, it was necessary to promote the enterprise and
productivity of an underlying arrangement.”).
38. Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust
Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1221 (2008).
39. See id.; see also Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210,
224 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 188–89 (7th Cir. 1985).
40. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 38, at 1221; see infra Part I.D (explaining the modes of
analysis courts employ).
41. Davis, supra note 10, at 291–92.
42. See United States v. eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
43. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, supra note 12, at 3.
44. See, e.g., Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 190.
45. Id. at 188–89; see infra Part I.D (discussing the modes of analysis).
46. Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 188–89 (“A court must distinguish between ‘naked’ restraints,
those in which the restriction on competition is unaccompanied by new production or
products, and ‘ancillary’ restraints, those that are part of a larger endeavor whose success they
promote.”).
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competitive effects, so such agreements are not automatically considered
violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.47
B. Threshold Questions
Courts determine whether a particular restraint violates section 1 of the
Sherman Act by answering two threshold questions.48 The first issue a court
considers involves interstate commerce—“whether there is an effect on trade
or commerce among more than one state.”49 It must be proved either that the
defendants’ conduct was in interstate commerce or substantially affected
interstate commerce.50 The second threshold issue is whether there is
sufficient agreement among two or more parties to constitute a “contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy.”51 If both elements are proven, the court then
employs one of three modes of analysis—the per se test, the rule of reason
test, or the quick-look approach (an abbreviated rule of reason test)—to
determine whether a particular agreement unlawfully restrains trade.52
Courts have interpreted restraint of trade to refer to only “unreasonable
restraints.”53
In no-poaching cases, the question of whether the alleged restraint affects
interstate commerce is rarely in dispute.54 In franchise no-poaching
agreements in particular, the interstate element is straightforward because the
employers in question operate either nationally or in multiple states, and the
agreements cover the individual franchises in multiple states across the
United States.55
What is less straightforward is whether no-poaching agreements in
franchise systems involve an unlawful contract, combination, or conspiracy
(often referred to as an “agreement”) among two or more parties.56 To prove
a Sherman Act section 1 violation the plaintiff must demonstrate that an
unlawful agreement has been made.57 However, the law has not been
conclusive in stating whether a franchisor and its franchisees are capable of
agreeing for purposes of establishing a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
47. Eichorn v. AT & T Corp, 248 F.3d 131, 144 (3d Cir. 2001). Ancillary restraints are
reviewed either under the rule of reason or under the quick-look approach. See infra Part I.D
for a detailed delineation of the modes of analysis.
48. Edelman, supra note 30, at 640.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743–44 (1976); Gulf
Coast Hotel-Motel Ass’n v. Miss. Gulf Coast Golf Course Ass’n, 658 F.3d 500, 507–08 (5th
Cir. 2011).
51. Edelman, supra note 30, at 640.
52. Id. at 640–41; see Lemley & Leslie, supra note 38, at 1213.
53. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
54. See, e.g., In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1115 n.10
(N.D. Cal. 2012).
55. See, e.g., Deslandes Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 15.
56. See Barry M. Block & Matthew D. Ridings, Antitrust Conspiracies in Franchise
Systems After American Needle, 30 FRANCHISE L.J. 216, 216–17 (2011).
57. Mary N. Strimel et al., No-Poach Agreements Land Franchisors in Hot Water,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.bna.com/nopoach-agreements-landn57982090975/ [https://perma.cc/2VDY-LXFY].
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Act.58 Nor is it settled law that a unilateral contract constitutes an
agreement.59 The U.S. Supreme Court held in Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp.60 that a parent company and its wholly owned
subsidiary, as a single economic unit, were incapable of conspiring under the
Sherman Act.61 The Court reasoned that because the parent corporation and
subsidiary shared a complete “unity of interest”—meaning the parent could
assert full control over the subsidiary—their collusion did not deprive the
market of the “independent centers of decisionmaking that competition
assumes and demands.”62
C. The Single-Entity Defense: A Sherman Act Section 1 Exemption
Courts disagree about the application of section 1 to agreements between
separate legal entities under the same corporate umbrella, which most
commonly involve a parent corporation and its less than wholly owned
subsidiary.63 Joint ventures, or “entities created by two or more firms for the
purpose of jointly engaging in some economic activity,” pose similar issues
with respect to the applicability of section 1.64 At first glance, joint ventures
appear to operate as a single firm in the market.65 Upon further review,
however, it becomes clear that joint ventures are often managed by multiple
separate firms that compete against one another.66 This creates the
possibility for joint ventures to collude in violation of section 1.67
1. History and Evolution of the Single-Entity Doctrine
Following the Copperweld decision, franchisors began to argue that a
franchisor and its franchisees are technically a single economic entity and, as
such, are incapable of entering into agreements in violation of section 1.68
The Ninth Circuit weighed in on this very issue in the case Williams v. I.B.
Fischer Nevada.69 In Williams, the plaintiff alleged that his employer’s
franchise agreements, which barred Jack-in-the-Box managers from moving
from one Jack-in-the-Box restaurant to another for six months without
permission from the previous restaurant owner, violated section 1.70 The
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
61. Id. at 777.
62. Id. at 769–71; see also Nathaniel Grow, American Needle and the Future of the Single
Entity Defense Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 449, 451 (2011).
63. Grow, supra note 62, at 450–51.
64. Id. at 451.
65. Id.; see also Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2006) (holding that the per se
standard did not apply to the companies because they were involved in a joint venture and,
therefore, were not competing with one another).
66. Grow, supra note 62, at 451.
67. Id.
68. See Strimel et al., supra note 57.
69. 999 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
70. Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nev., 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1029 (D. Nev. 1992), aff’d, 999
F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); see also Lindsay et al., supra note 4, at 10–11.
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district court held that the franchisor’s control over the franchisees and their
shared economic goals “ma[d]e them a single enterprise, incapable of
competing for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”71 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed, holding that “[t]o be capable of conspiring, corporate
entities must be ‘sufficiently independent of each other.’”72 The court
concluded that the district court correctly held that the franchisor and its
franchisees are clearly a “common enterprise.”73
Following Williams, other federal courts outside the Ninth Circuit reached
similar conclusions. These courts held that franchisees and franchisors are
not capable of conspiring to restrain trade, either because they are a single
economic entity or, alternatively, because the franchise agreement was
unilaterally imposed by the franchisor.74 However, in 2010, the U.S.
Supreme Court held in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League75
that the National Football League (NFL), which is comprised of thirty-two
separately owned, franchised football clubs, was “not categorically beyond
the coverage of § 1.”76 When the NFL granted an exclusive license to
Reebok to manufacture trademarked headwear for all thirty-two teams,
former licensee American Needle claimed that the agreement violated the
Sherman Act.77 In rejecting the league’s single-entity defense and
determining that the teams could be capable of a section 1 agreement, the
Supreme Court held that “the NFL’s licensing activities constitute[d]
concerted action that [wa]s not categorically beyond the coverage of § 1.”78
Here, the Court concluded that the Copperweld doctrine did not apply but
rather that “[t]he legality of th[e] concerted action [by the NFL teams and the
licensing entity] must be judged under the Rule of Reason.”79 The Court
remanded the case to the lower court for further consideration.80 Despite this
outcome, franchisors continue to rely on the single-entity defense, but this
reasoning has become increasingly questionable, as co-franchisees operate in
a competitive relationship with each other for some purposes, including the
hiring of employees.81

71. Williams, 794 F. Supp. at 1032.
72. Williams, 999 F.2d at 447 (quoting Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d
614, 617 (9th Cir. 1979)).
73. See id.
74. See, e.g., Search Int’l, Inc. v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 621, 625 (N.D.
Tex. 2001), aff’d, 31 F. App’x 151 (5th Cir. 2001); Hall v. Burger King Corp., 912 F. Supp.
1509, 1548 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
75. 560 U.S. 183 (2010).
76. Id. at 186.
77. See Grow, supra note 62, at 470–71.
78. Id. at 475.
79. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 186.
80. Id. at 204.
81. 3 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION,
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 16:43 (4th ed. 2017).
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2. Current Applicability to No-Poaching Franchise Cases
Because American Needle did not adopt a clear single-entity standard, a
court could find that a franchisor and franchisee are separate economic actors
and subject to liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act.82 However, a
franchise system can still argue that it should be treated as a single economic
enterprise.83 A court’s analysis will vary based on the facts and
circumstances of each case, namely based on the structure and operation of
each franchise.84 The single-entity defense is more likely to prevail the
“greater the amount of control of the franchise system that the franchisor
exercises and the more the franchisor limits competition between the
franchisor and the franchisees and among franchisees.”85 This defense has
been applied differently by both federal and state courts, and as a result, the
current doctrine remains open to interpretation.86
The single-entity defense has gained significance in no-poaching cases that
involve franchised systems.87 A 2018 study revealed that more than half of
all companies with more than 500 franchise stores in the United States
impose some kind of lateral recruiting restriction.88 Citing this study,89
Senators Cory Booker and Elizabeth Warren charged that “fully 58 percent
of the 156 largest franchisors operating around 340,000 franchise units used
some form of anti-competitive ‘no-poach’ agreements.”90 Further, they
noted that these agreements were particularly prevalent in low-wage, highturnover industries.91 The study highlighted that these agreements are
common in franchise companies in industries with high labor turnover like
quick service restaurants.92 In response to these developments, a number of
private plaintiffs have filed class action complaints against their fast-food
franchisor employers challenging the restrictive hiring and solicitation terms
in their franchise agreements by alleging restraints of competition.93 The
complaints in these cases argue that franchisees are not joint employers;
82. See Strimel et al., supra note 57.
83. Block & Ridings, supra note 56, at 223–24.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 221.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 216.
88. See Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 23, at 4; see also Abrams, supra note 3.
89. See generally Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 23 (finding that no-poaching
agreements are more commonly used by franchises in low-wage and high-turnover industries).
Franchises outside of the fast-food restaurant industry using similar no-poaching agreements
include Jiffy Lube, H&R Block, and Anytime Fitness, LLC. Id. at 5–6.
90. See Letter from Elizabeth Warren and Cory A. Booker to Jeff Sessions, supra note 14,
at 1.
91. See id.
92. Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 23, at 4–5, 9.
93. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint ¶ 1, Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, No.
18-133 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2018), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Butler Complaint]; Class Action
Complaint ¶ 1, Ion v. Pizza Hut, LLC, No. 17-788 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2017), ECF No. 1
[hereinafter Ion Complaint]; Deslandes Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 1; Class Action Complaint
¶ 1, Bautista v. Carl Karcher Enters., No. BC 649777 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 2017)
[hereinafter Bautista Complaint].

2296

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

franchisees are third-party beneficiaries of the no-poaching agreements and
other terms; franchisees compete against each other and against companyowned stores; and, most notably, the no-poaching agreements restrict
franchisees from hiring employees of other franchisees.94 The complaints
further assert that the no-poaching provisions are horizontal restraints that
are per se unlawful under the Sherman Act.95 In Deslandes v. McDonald’s
USA, LLC, the court found a no-hire provision in a McDonald’s franchise
agreement to be a horizontal restraint of trade.96 The court applied the quicklook approach to analyze the defendant’s claim, despite finding that the
parties were a single enterprise.97
D. Modes of Analysis
Federal courts utilize one of three modes of analysis to determine whether
a particular agreement unreasonably restrains trade: the per se rule, the rule
of reason, or the quick-look approach.98 Agreements that are considered per
se illegal are condemned without further inquiry. If the rule of reason applies,
a court will balance all of the circumstances to determine whether there is an
unreasonable restraint on competition. The quick-look approach is an
abbreviated rule of reason analysis, whereby a court may categorize a
restraint without conducting a full-blown economic analysis.99
The per se rule applies to restraints “that would always or almost always
tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”100 If the restraint reduces
output or increases prices but is unrelated to any joint economic activity,
courts will typically deem it per se illegal.101 The per se category is narrow
and reaches only conduct that is proved to be consistently anticompetitive
through extended experience, such as “price fixing, bid rigging, and customer
and territorial allocations.”102
Conversely, if a restraint makes economic activity possible that would
otherwise be impossible without the restraint, or if it contributes to an
economically efficient outcome, then courts will typically review the
94. See generally Butler Complaint, supra note 93; Ion Complaint, supra note 93;
Deslandes Complaint, supra note 5; Bautista Complaint, supra note 93.
95. See Butler Complaint, supra note 93, ¶¶ 19, 172; Ion Complaint, supra note 93, ¶¶ 1,
10, 103; Deslandes Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 12, 133.
96. Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17-4857, 2018 WL 3105955, at *6 (N.D.
Ill. June 28, 2017); see infra Part III.B (discussing, in detail, the facts and issues of the case).
97. Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *5.
98. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 38, at 1213–16.
99. Id. at 1215.
100. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (quoting
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp. 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).
101. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 38, at 1221 (outlining the approaches courts take in
analyzing agreements under section 1).
102. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at III-12 (2018); see, e.g., United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 212–13 (1940) (citing United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), and United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505
(1898), as examples of early cases holding that price-fixing agreements are per se violations);
see also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST HANDBOOK FOR FRANCHISE AND
DISTRIBUTION PRACTITIONERS 4 (2008).
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restraint under the more flexible rule of reason standard.103 Unlike the per
se rule, there is no bright-line test for whether a restraint is illegal under the
rule of reason.104 In applying the rule of reason, courts will “balance the procompetitive benefits of conduct against its potential for anticompetitive
harm.”105
In some cases involving horizontal agreements with pro-competitive
justifications, courts will utilize a modified rule of reason analysis known as
the quick look.106 Under this approach, the court will determine whether “an
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive
effect on customers and markets.”107 Using the quick-look approach, the
court may determine whether conduct that appears to be anticompetitive on
its face is per se illegal by considering the defendant’s pro-competitive
justifications for the conduct.108 If the defendant can offer plausible
economic reasons that the conduct is pro-competitive, the court will weigh
the defendant’s competitive justifications against the alleged antitrust harms
under the rule of reason.109 But if the defendant cannot offer sufficient
justifications, the conduct is deemed illegal.110
II. A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF NO-POACHING
ANTITRUST CASES
Courts have traditionally analyzed no-poaching agreements under antitrust
laws because the market for employee labor and skills is a market subject to
the Sherman Act.111 That is, the labor market is a market for antitrust
purposes, and no-poaching agreements can restrain competition among
employers for workers.112 Part II.A chronicles the precedent of no-poaching
cases, beginning with the case that first addressed the issue and ending with
a more modern application. Part II.B explores a contemporary no-poaching
case involving Silicon Valley technology companies. This analysis
emphasizes both the legal and economic implications of no-poaching
agreements and the anticompetitive harm they produce.

103. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 38, at 1223; see Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (declaring and articulating the rule of reason standard); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59–60 (1911).
104. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 102, at 5.
105. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 38, at 1251.
106. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
107. Id.
108. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 38, at 1215.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT & T Corp, 248 F.3d 131, 140–41 (3d Cir. 2001); Cesnik v.
Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859, 864 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
112. Eichorn, 248 F.3d at 140–41.
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A. Development of Antitrust Scrutiny of No-Poaching Agreements
Historically, courts have applied the rule of reason to no-poaching
agreements.113 In Union Circulation Co. v. FTC,114 one of the first cases
concerning no-poaching agreements, the Second Circuit applied the rule of
reason and found that the “no-switching” agreements unreasonably
restrained trade.115 In this case, the court assessed the legality of an
agreement among magazine and periodical subscription companies to refrain
from hiring each other’s employees for specified periods of time, often one
year.116 The companies claimed the agreements were created to promote
professional conduct among salesmen in response to fraudulent practices in
the industry.117 The companies argued that the agreements had a legitimate
business justification—that without the agreements in place, the salesmen
would be able to switch to another employer in the industry easily and
companies would be less likely to curtail and eliminate fraudulent
practices.118 The Second Circuit held that the companies had violated
section 1 because the agreements harmed competition by “freez[ing] the
labor supply.”119 The court reasoned that the agreement was not sufficiently
tailored to deter fraudulent practices because it pertained to all salesmen;
therefore, the agreement’s reach extended beyond what was reasonably
necessary.120
Although naked no-poaching agreements, like the one in Union
Circulation Co., violate section 1, there are instances in which no-poaching
agreements may be considered lawful ancillary restraints aimed at a
legitimate business purpose.121 However, “businesses must carefully
execute the agreements to ensure that they are narrowly tailored by scope,
duration, job function, product type, geography, or a combination of these
limits.”122 In 2001, the Third Circuit applied the rule of reason to a nopoaching agreement in Eichorn v. AT & T Corp.123 Here, the court evaluated
a no-poaching agreement between a parent company (AT&T) and one of its
affiliates following a divestiture.124 The agreement in question applied only
to employees who earned $50,000 or more annually and also included a time

113. Davis, supra note 10, at 287.
114. 241 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1957).
115. Id. at 658.
116. Id. at 654–55.
117. Id. at 655.
118. Id. at 657.
119. Id. at 658.
120. Id.
121. See Cesnik v. Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859, 866–67 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). For an
example of an ancillary restraint in the joint-venture context, see generally Texaco, Inc. v.
Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
122. Davis, supra note 10, at 297; see Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,
238 (1918).
123. 248 F.3d 131, 144–45 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting per se analysis and applying the rule
of reason).
124. Id. at 139 (noting that “[i]t was not until AT & T divested all of its stock in [a
subsidiary] . . . that the two companies became completely separate entities”).
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restriction of eight months.125 The court held that the limitation on both
scope and duration was sufficient to make the agreement a reasonable and
ancillary restraint.126 The court further stated that the agreement lacked a
“significant anti-competitive effect” on labor in the industry by fixing
wages.127
B. Case Study: In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation
In 2010, no-poaching agreements were the subject of litigation once again,
this time involving several technology companies.128 The DOJ brought civil
enforcement actions against technology companies for entering into nopoaching agreements with one another.129 In these cases, the competitors
agreed not to cold-call each other’s employees.130 Since the cases settled,
the companies avoided public disclosure of their recruiting practices.131
However, these cases had the residual effect of provoking discourse on the
harm that no-poaching agreements can cause.132
1. Factual Background and Nature of the Agreements Made
In September 2010, the DOJ filed a complaint against six high-tech
companies—Adobe, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, and Pixar—alleging that
their hiring-practice agreements violated antitrust laws.133 These agreements
were not clearly pure no-switching agreements; instead they restricted the
companies from cold-calling each other’s employees.134 For example, the
companies in this case135 had entered into a series of bilateral “Do Not Cold
Call” agreements from 2005 to 2007, whereby each company’s recruiting
department refrained from cold-calling the employees of the other
company.136
In December 2010, the DOJ filed a second complaint against Lucasfilm
and Pixar alleging that the two companies had agreed to restrictions beyond

125. Id. at 136–37.
126. Id. at 148.
127. Id.
128. Lindsay et al., supra note 4, at 6–8.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case, supra note 20.
132. Id.
133. A consolidated class action lawsuit brought by employees of the high-tech companies
followed the DOJ investigation. In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103,
1108 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
134. “Cold-calling” is the practice of contacting another firm’s employee who has not
otherwise applied for a job opening. This form of solicitation can be done orally, in writing,
telephonically, or electronically. See id. at 1111; see also Consolidated Amended Complaint
¶ 42, In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 11CV-02509-LHK), ECF No. 65 [hereinafter High-Tech Complaint].
135. Competitive Impact Statement at 1–2, United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 10-cv01629 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2010), ECF No. 2 [hereinafter Adobe Competitive Impact Statement].
136. In re High-Tech Emp., 856 F. Supp. 2d at 1110; see also Lindsay & Santon, supra
note 6, at 75.
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recruiting.137 The court found that the agreement between Lucasfilm and
Pixar that was at issue138 contained the following terms:
59. First, each agreed not to cold call each other’s employees.
60. Second, each agreed to notify the other company when making an offer
to an employee of the other company, if that employee applied for a job
notwithstanding the absence of cold calling.
61. Third, each agreed that if either made an offer to such an employee of
the other company, neither company would counteroffer above the initial
offer. This third agreement was created with the intent and effect of
eliminating “bidding wars,” whereby an employee could use multiple
rounds of bidding between Pixar and Lucasfilm to increase her total
compensation.139

In both cases, the DOJ argued that the agreements were per se illegal.140 The
cases settled and the court did not decide whether to apply the per se rule or
the rule of reason, but the court accepted the government’s arguments that
the restraint had depressed wages and restricted employee mobility.141 The
court reasoned that a quiet “handshake agreement” between competing
technology companies was adequate grounds for a per se antitrust claim.142
2. Labor-Economics Perspective and Restraint on Labor Markets
If, for example, no-poaching agreements are restrictions on customers and
not employees, the per se antitrust violation becomes clearer.143 From this
viewpoint, the agreements would prohibit employers from calling each
other’s customers, from requiring notice when offering to sell a product to
another company’s customers, and from offering a lower price than what the
other companies were offering.144 This type of agreement would result in
higher prices for consumers due to the lack of competition.145 As an analog
to workers receiving lower wages because of the lack of competition, this is
a direct example of a market-allocation and price-fixing agreement, which is
a per se violation.146
In United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc.,147 the DOJ argued, “There is no
basis for distinguishing allocation agreements based on whether they involve
input or output markets. Anticompetitive agreements in both input and

137. In re High-Tech Emp., 856 F. Supp. 2d at 1111; see also Lindsay at al., supra note 4,
at 6.
138. Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Lucasfilm Ltd., No. 10-cv-02220
(D.D.C. June 3, 2011), ECF No. 2 [hereinafter Lucasfilm Competitive Impact Statement].
139. High-Tech Complaint, supra note 134, at 11; see Davis, supra note 10, at 281.
140. In re High-Tech Emp., 856 F. Supp. 2d at 1117.
141. See id. at 1123.
142. Id. at 1109; see Davis, supra note 10, at 281.
143. Lindsay & Santon, supra note 6, at 75.
144. Id.
145. See Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case, supra note 20.
146. Lindsay & Santon, supra note 6, at 75; see supra Part I (discussing the types of
agreements proscribed by section 1 of the Sherman Act and the per se rule generally).
147. No. 1:10-cv-01629 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 18, 2011).
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output markets create allocative inefficiencies.”148 The DOJ applied a
similar analysis to employment markets in United States v. Lucasfilm Ltd.149
by stating that “[a]ntitrust analysis of downstream customer-related restraints
applies equally to upstream monopsony restraints on employment
opportunities.”150 The DOJ correctly focused on the direct restraint that the
agreements imposed on labor markets rather than the effects they have in a
downstream market.151 This is because the anticompetitive effect of the
agreements restrained competition for the services of highly skilled
technology employees and deprived them of better job opportunities and
potentially higher compensation.152 In analyzing the defenses, the DOJ
acknowledged that, given the collaboration and business relationships
between the companies, some of the restraints might have been justified.153
However, the DOJ noted that even though the restrictions protected business
interests, such as the investment in and training of employees, they were not
sufficiently tailored to protect the interests of the employees.154
III. ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO NO-POACHING
AGREEMENTS IN THE FRANCHISE SECTOR
The use of no-poaching agreements in the franchise sector raises various
issues—both legal and economic. Using the analysis from Part II, Part III.A
compares no-poaching agreements used in franchised and unfranchised
industries to show that, while there are distinctions, the anticompetitive
effects are similar. Then, Part III.B analyzes the arguments proffered against
no-poaching agreements in a pending case involving the fast-food franchise
McDonald’s. Part III.C discusses additional pending cases, and Part III.D
reviews the validity of the complaints, weighing the defendants’
justifications against the harm caused.
A. Comparison of No-Poaching Agreements in Franchised and
Unfranchised Industries
No-poaching cases in the franchise sector differ from unfranchised cases,
such as the high-tech cases, in two primary respects.155 One is a factual
148. Adobe Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 135, at 8.
149. No. 1:10-cv-02220 (D.D.C. June 3, 2011).
150. Lucasfilm Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 138, at 5–6. Monopsony is often
referred to as the inverse of monopoly, or one buyer of a product. In the labor-market context,
firms are the consumer, and as they grow in size, they are capable of dominating local labor
markets. See KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 6.
151. Lindsay et al., supra note 4, at 75. Wharton professor of legal studies and business
ethics Janice Bellace has described the labor market: “[E]mployers buy labor on that market,
and job seekers sell their labor. Supply and demand then serves to set the price for a given
type of labor.” Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case, supra note 20.
152. Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case, supra note 20.
153. Adobe Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 135, at 8–9 (“Restraints that are
broader than reasonably necessary to achieve the efficiencies from a business collaboration
are not ancillary and are properly treated as per se unlawful.”).
154. Id. at 8.
155. Strimel et al., supra note 57.
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distinction regarding the nature of the entities that utilize the agreements at
issue.156 In Adobe and in Lucasfilm, the agreements were among
independent companies, whereas in franchise cases, franchisors mandate
these agreements with their franchisees to prevent employees from leaving
one franchise to work at another within the same corporate chain.157 The
second distinction is a policy one—the former involves highly skilled
technical workers and the latter involves lower-skilled workers in highturnover industries.158
In fast-food restaurant franchise no-poaching cases, a franchisor and its
franchisees have joint economic goals, including providing a uniform
product, service, brand, and quality of service to the customer.159 In a recent
settlement of a no-poaching agreement case outside the franchise context, the
DOJ permitted the parties to enter into reasonable no-solicitation agreements,
which were considered ancillary to a legitimate business collaboration.160
Franchise cases differ to the extent that franchisees operate under a common
corporate umbrella, yet they may also compete against one another in a
variety of areas.161
The range of competition between a franchisor and its franchisees will vary
from one franchise system to another depending on factors such as “whether
the franchisor operates company outlets, whether the franchisees are granted
exclusive territories, and the geographic locations of the various outlets.”162
The major factors in evaluating whether a franchisor-franchisee relationship
is a single economic enterprise are revenue allocation, the level of
coordination between the franchisor and franchisees, and the amount of
control the franchisor exerts over the franchisee.163 While it is generally true
that the franchisor and its franchisees share a common interest in promoting
the franchise system, individual franchises are separately owned entities.164
In many cases, individual franchise outlets, particularly in highly
concentrated geographic areas, compete for customers and employees.165
Courts must balance the arguments for (e.g., promoting the franchise
156. Id.
157. See How Fair—or Legal—Are Non-Poaching Agreements?, supra note 23; supra Part
II.B (discussing the agreements at issue in In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation).
158. Krueger & Ashenfelter, supra note 23, at 4. See generally KRUEGER & POSNER, supra
note 13 (addressing the issues of wage stagnation and increasing inequality, which particularly
affect low-income workers).
159. Strimel et al., supra note 57.
160. See United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG, No. 18-cv-00747-CKK, 2018 WL 4386565,
at *2 (D.D.C. July 11, 2018). The defendants entered into a settlement with the DOJ relating
to their respective employee recruiting, solicitation, and hiring practices following a federal
civil antitrust complaint alleging that the two companies “entered into agreements that
restrained cold calling, soliciting, recruiting, hiring, or otherwise competing for employees
(collectively, ‘no-poach agreements’) in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.” Id. at *7–
8.
161. See Strimel et al., supra note 57.
162. See Block & Ridings, supra note 56, at 221.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 220.
165. Id.
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system’s efficiency) and against (e.g., limiting employees’ options) no-hire
or no-poaching agreements.166 A recent wave of cases involving nopoaching agreements among franchises demonstrates this tension.
B. Case Study: Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC
Leinani Deslandes started as an entry-level crew member and was initially
paid $7.00 per hour at a McDonald’s franchise in Apopka, Florida, where she
worked her way up into management.167 After years of working at the same
location, Deslandes applied for a position with a competing McDonald’s
restaurant in Orlando, Florida, that offered a higher salary and better working
conditions.168 Deslandes received an offer from the Orlando McDonald’s;
however, the following day, she received a call from the McDonald’s
corporate office informing her that, due to a provision in the company’s
franchise agreement, the restaurant could not hire her unless she was released
by the Apopka McDonald’s.169 Since Deslandes could not be hired by
another McDonald’s, she ultimately quit her job and was forced to take an
entry-level position in another industry for lower pay.170 Deslandes brought
a class action suit against McDonald’s claiming that the provision violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act and state law.171
The relevant provision from the McDonald’s franchise agreement, which
is invisible to McDonald’s employees,172 stated:
Interference With Employment Relations of Others. During the term of
this Franchise, Franchisee shall not employ or seek to employ any person
who is at the time employed by McDonald’s, any of its subsidiaries, or by
any person who is at the time operating a McDonald’s restaurant or
otherwise induce, directly or indirectly, such person to leave such
employment. This paragraph [] shall not be violated if such person has left

166. See Strimel et al., supra note 57.
167. See Deslandes Complaint, supra note 5, ¶¶ 59–69. After about three months working
at the Apopka McDonald’s, Deslandes was promoted to Shift Manager earning $10.00 per
hour, and in 2011, Deslandes was promoted to Department Manager of Guest Services earning
$12.00 per hour. Id. ¶¶ 61–62.
168. Id. ¶¶ 66–67. The complaint alleges that the Apopka McDonald’s violated overtime
laws and cancelled Deslandes’s managerial training upon learning that she was pregnant. Id.
¶¶ 64–65.
169. Id. ¶ 68.
170. Deslandes Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 71. Deslandes took a job at Hobby Lobby, a
retail store at a rate of $10.25 per hour. Id.
171. Id. ¶ 121.
172. These provisions are invisible to the employee because they are included in contracts
between the franchisors and franchisees. Evan Starr, assistant professor of management and
organization at the Robert H. Smith School of Business at the University of Maryland,
explains:
The worker does not agree to this [agreement]. If they don’t get along with their
manager, or if they learn that it’s not a good work environment, or perhaps they have
to move locations for some reasons, and their skills are basically perfectly
transferable to another franchise within that same company, then they’re not able to
do that.
How Fair—or Legal—Are Non-Poaching Agreements?, supra note 23 (alteration in original).
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the employ of any of the foregoing parties for a period in excess of six (6)
months.173

McDonald’s argued that agreements in a franchise arrangement, like the one
in question, are technically “vertical” rather than “horizontal,” which, if
accepted, provides them more latitude under antitrust statutes and the mode
of analysis courts decide to apply.174 However, the court here found that the
agreement was horizontal and not entirely vertical—that the alleged restraint
was ancillary to the McDonald’s franchise agreements and was horizontal
with “vertical elements.”175 While the McDonald’s franchise agreement
included a time restriction of six months, unlike some other franchise
business models, it did not impose additional tailored restrictions, such as
exclusive grants, exclusive territorial rights, protected territory, or any right
to exclude or control.176 It also failed to tailor its conditions to the location
or development of future McDonald’s restaurants at any time.177
The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the Illinois
state law claims, but it denied the motion to dismiss the Sherman Act
section 1 violation allegations.178 The court rejected the defendant’s
argument that the no-poaching provision was necessary to protect itself from
horizontal competition for employees because the legal issue “is not about
competition for the sale of hamburgers to consumers.”179 Instead, “[i]t is
about competition for employees.”180
From a policy standpoint, the court also recognized that because most
individuals in the low-skill employment market do not have the luxury of not
working for a six-month period, “the no-hire provision effectively prevented
competing McDonald’s franchises (as well as the company-owned stores)
from competing for experienced, low-skill employees.”181 But the court
ultimately concluded that the restraint did not constitute a per se unlawful
restraint because the agreement was ancillary to otherwise pro-competitive
franchise agreements as a whole.182 In other words, despite the restraint
appearing to be facially anticompetitive, the court found that McDonald’s
had successfully claimed an output-enhancing effect of a no-poaching

173. Deslandes Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 87 (alteration in original). McDonald’s has
since removed the no-hire and no-solicit provisions from its franchise agreement. The plaintiff
seeks damages for the opportunities she may have missed to switch franchises previously
despite the fact that those opportunities are available now. Id.
174. Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *6; see also KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 13, at
11.
175. Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *6.
176. Id. at *1.
177. Id.; see also Deslandes Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 75.
178. Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *1.
179. Id. at *8. McDonald’s argued that the no-poaching provision promoted interbrand
competition between McDonald’s and other fast-food chains, such as Burger King, rather than
intrabrand competition between two McDonald’s franchises. Id.
180. Id. at *8.
181. Id. at *1.
182. Id. at *7.
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agreement, which was sufficient to defeat a claim of a per se violation.183
The court permitted the employee’s antitrust claim to proceed under a quicklook analysis.184 As of this writing, this case has been appealed, though many
legal experts believe that it is unlikely that the court’s ruling will be
reversed.185 Due to the increased legislative and administrative pressure186
to eliminate no-poaching provisions across the board, franchisors may
ultimately decide that litigation is not worth the cost.187
C. Other Recent Relevant Cases
Recently, additional franchises faced similar antitrust allegations resulting
from their no-poaching provisions.188 In February 2017, two former shift
leaders at Carl’s Jr., Luis Bautista and Margarita Guerrero, brought a putative
class action suit against Carl Karcher Enterprises LLC (CKE), the parent
company of fast-food chain Carl’s Jr.189 The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged
that Carl’s Jr. Restaurants LLC and CKE required all franchisees to agree to
183. Id.; see also Fawn Johnson, Fair Play: McDonald’s, Little Caesars Suits Tee Up
Worker Questions, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 16, 2018), https://www.bna.com/fair-playmcdonalds-b73014482562/ [https://perma.cc/3AFQ-8Q65]. The output effect was producing
more burgers and fries.
184. Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *7–8.
185. Rupert M. Barkoff, No-Poaching and Non-Compete Provisions: Long-Time Practices
Go Under the Microscope, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 17, 2018, 2:40 PM), https://www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/2018/09/17/no-poaching-and-non-compete-provisions-long-timepractices-go-under-the-microscope/ [https://perma.cc/9GLF-8UY9].
186. Id. In March 2018, Senators Elizabeth Warren and Cory Booker introduced federal
legislation prohibiting no-poaching agreements (the End Employer Collusion Act). The
Justice Department’s Antitrust Division likewise has begun investigations into several large
franchisors that utilize no-poaching provisions. Id.
187. Id. There are many franchisors that have voluntarily and preemptively abandoned
their no-poaching provisions. McDonald’s, for example, has eliminated the provision from
new franchise agreements and indicated that it would not enforce such provisions contained
in older agreements. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. Recently, four fast-food
chains—Dunkin’ Donuts, Arby’s, Five Guys Burgers and Fries, and Little Caesars—also
agreed to end their no-poaching provisions. See Hailey Konnath, 4 More Fast-Food Chains
Vow to End No-Poach Agreements, LAW360 (Mar. 12, 2019, 10:55 PM),
https://www.law360.com/competition/articles/1138135 [https://perma.cc/QWT7-MCKG].
188. See, e.g., Butler Complaint, supra note 93, ¶ 1; Ion Complaint, supra note 93, ¶ 2.
There is also an effort at the state level to eliminate no-poaching provisions. Washington State
Attorney General Bob Ferguson filed a lawsuit against national sandwich chain Jersey Mike’s
after the company refused to remove no-poaching provisions from its franchise agreements.
The complaint alleges a violation of state competition laws, but the anticompetitive arguments
are comparable. See AG Ferguson Announces Major Milestones in Initiative to Eliminate NoPoach Clauses Nationwide, Files Lawsuit Against Jersey Mike’s, WASH. ST. OFF. ATT’Y GEN.
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-ferguson-announces-majormilestones-initiative-eliminate-no-poach-clauses [https://perma.cc/5GKQ-XAG5].
189. Braden Campbell, CKE Restaurants Hit with Antitrust Class Action, LAW360 (Feb. 8,
2017, 4:26 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/889807/cke-restaurants-hit-with-antitrustclass-action [https://perma.cc/8HL2-PKHD]. Carl Karcher Enterprises, LLC, through its
subsidiaries, owns, operates, and franchises a chain of fast-food restaurants in the United
States and internationally. The company operates under the name Carl’s Jr. See Company
Overview of Carl Karcher Enterprises, LLC, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/
research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=896644 [https://perma.cc/2S7C-FTQL] (last
visited Mar. 15, 2019).
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a no-hire provision that prevents one franchisee from hiring employees at the
level of shift leader or higher from other franchisees without the franchisor’s
advance written consent.190
The CKE complaint deals exclusively with California state law.191 The
no-hire provisions are alleged to be naked restraints of trade, which depress
employee wages, restrict employee mobility, and reduce benefits and job
growth opportunities for employees.192 The relevant provision from a CKE
franchise agreement states:
(2) Accordingly, Franchisee covenants and agrees that, except with CKE’s
prior written consent, during the term of this Agreement, and for a period
of 2 years following its expiration, transfer, or termination, Franchisee shall
not, either directly or indirectly, for itself, or through, on behalf of, or in
conjunction with, any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or other
entity:
...
(b) Knowingly employ or seek to employ any person then employed by CKE
or any franchisee of CKE as a shift leader or higher, or otherwise directly
or indirectly induce such person to leave his or her employment.193

The terms of this agreement are narrower than the terms at issue in
Deslandes because the terms only apply to those employed as a “shift leader
or higher,”194 whereas the McDonald’s agreement pertained to “any person”
employed.195 But the CKE agreement is also broader in that it does not
specify a restricted time duration.196 The defendants allege that the CKE
franchise model is designed to encourage franchise competition—by not
providing exclusive geographic territories for its franchisees, each franchisee
is encouraged to compete for both customers and employees.197
Notwithstanding the no-hire agreement, CKE franchisees have publicly
claimed that they have complete discretion over hiring decisions.198 Other
recent lawsuits include similar allegations designed to show that the
franchisees operate in competition against each other, as well as against
company-owned stores, which rebuts the franchises’ single-entity
defenses.199

190. Bautista Complaint, supra note 93, ¶¶ 2, 47–49.
191. Id. ¶¶ 15–17.
192. Id. ¶ 2.
193. Id. ¶ 52.
194. Id.
195. See Deslandes Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 87.
196. See id. The no-poaching provision in a McDonald’s franchise agreement was limited
to a six-month period. Id.
197. Bautista Complaint, supra note 93, ¶¶ 40–41, 45–47.
198. Id. ¶ 46. The complaint notes that one CKE franchisee was quoted in a Wall Street
Journal article stating that he “cho[oses] whom to hire.” Id. (alteration in original).
199. Strimel et al., supra note 57; see, e.g., Butler Complaint, supra note 93, ¶¶ 60, 77; Ion
Complaint, supra note 93, ¶¶ 74–75.
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D. Validity of Recent Complaints
As these cases are currently pending, a court has not yet ruled on this issue
as a matter of law. Although the rulings of the aforementioned no-poaching
suits in the franchised food industry cannot be fully predicted, these suits are
likely to multiply.200 This section examines the defendants’ pro-competitive
justifications and explains why these justifications may be insufficient to
evade a section 1 violation.
1. Defenses and Pro-Competitive Justifications
Franchises may have valid legal justifications to defend the use of nopoaching agreements if they are reasonably tailored to further procompetitive justifications.201 Some of these justifications, as discussed in
Deslandes and other recent cases, include promoting interbrand competition
among competing franchise chains and encouraging investment in employee
training.202 Although the district court in Deslandes rejected both of these
arguments, it made clear that narrowly tailored no-poaching provisions could
serve the pro-competitive purpose of improving franchise investment in
employee training by limiting the clause’s applicability to employees above
a certain level or to employees who receive additional management
training.203 Therefore, no-poaching agreements that are limited in scope,
duration, geography, the category of employees to whom they apply, or some
or all of these are likely to face less scrutiny with respect to antitrust issues
compared to blanket no-poaching agreements that apply to all employees.204
Defenders of no-poaching agreements have also argued that no-hire
agreements are essential to the franchise model as they prevent free riding on
training investments by the franchisees.205 For example, defendants contend
that franchisees incur costs to provide specialized training to managementlevel employees.206 This training may include sending the employees to
corporate classes and providing one-on-one proprietary training for skills
specific to the franchise system.207 The argument here is that franchisees
could free-ride on these specialized investments by poaching employees after
another franchisee incurs the training costs.208 This could effectively deter
franchisees from providing the specialized training in the first place, which
200. See Strimel et al., supra note 57.
201. Paul Eckles et al., The Fight Against No-Poach Agreements Is Expanding, LAW360
(Oct. 23, 2018, 1:09 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1094204/the-fight-against-nopoach-agreements-is-expanding [https://perma.cc/H9BE-F35V].
202. Id.; see also Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17-4857, 2018 WL 3105955,
at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018). The court further recognized that McDonald’s continued to
sign franchise agreements even after it removed the no-hire provision in 2017, which
suggested that “the no-hire provision was not necessary to encourage franchisees to sign” the
franchise agreement. Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *7.
203. Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *8.
204. Eckles et al., supra note 201.
205. Id.
206. See KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 13.
207. See Strimel et al., supra note 57.
208. See id.
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would be detrimental both to the company and the workers who are deprived
of the training.209
In addition to promoting intrabrand competition, or competition between
two or more McDonald’s restaurants in different locations, defendants in
these cases have argued that no-poaching provisions also promote interbrand
competition, or competition with direct, horizontal competitors, such as
Burger King and other fast-food restaurant chains.210 The court in
Deslandes, however, found this argument unpersuasive.211 There, plaintiffs
asserted that McDonald’s “divided the market for employees” by prohibiting
restaurants from hiring each other’s current or former employees.212 In the
labor market context, the individual franchises are competing brands.213
Therefore, instead of promoting interbrand competition, the court found that
dividing the market restrains intrabrand competition.214 If the labor market
extends beyond just one franchise chain—including all fast food, all
restaurants, or even all low-wage jobs in a particular geographic market—
then the market harm is broader than the alleged harm from a single nopoaching agreement.215
Whichever level of scrutiny the court applies in the franchise fast-food
cases—be it per se, rule of reason, or quick-look216—plaintiffs will likely
demonstrate harms resulting from the lack of competition among franchisees
for their labor and the potential for lost mobility and depressed wages.217
Ultimately, franchisors currently using no-poaching agreements or
considering doing so should examine their own franchise structure in terms
of its coordination and control over its franchisees.218 Furthermore,
franchisors should assess whether their valid pro-competitive justifications
for the agreement outweigh any anticompetitive effects.219
2. Economic and Social Policy Considerations
Many employers have reiterated the defense of no-poaching agreements as
a mode of protecting their investments in their employees.220 While this
defense carries some validity in higher-skill and lower-turnover industries, it

209. See id. (explaining that this argument is rooted in allowing franchisees to reap the
benefits of their investments).
210. See, e.g., Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17-4857, 2018 WL 3105955,
at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (citing McDonald’s and Burger King as examples of direct,
interbrand competitors).
211. See supra Part III.B (explaining the court’s reasoning).
212. See, e.g., Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955, at *8.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See supra Part I.D (describing the different modes of analysis).
217. Strimel et al., supra note 57.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 13.
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is insufficient for blanket agreements in the fast-food industry.221
Furthermore, there are a variety of more efficient ways to protect
investments—such as employee incentive plans and a plethora of retention
tools—which do not impede labor market competition in the same way nopoaching agreements do.222 According to Wharton professor of management
Peter Cappelli, “A no-poaching pact ‘benefits the companies at the expense
of their employees. Companies could achieve the same results by making it
attractive enough for employees not to leave.’”223 An analogous argument
can be made for no-poaching agreements between franchisors and
franchisees.224 As noted, franchisors likewise have argued that no-poaching
agreements within the franchise are critical for investment in their employees
and lead to more specific training, but it is not clear whether the training
would be lost to the franchise if no-poaching agreements were banned.225 If
this defense holds true, then the companies concede that they are, in fact,
separate economic actors.226 Otherwise, an employee who benefits from the
training provided by one franchisee would be able to transfer those same
skills to another franchisee without the franchisor losing out on its
investment.227
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR CURRENT AND FUTURE FRANCHISE CASES
Labor economics principles, along with no-poaching antitrust precedent
and the current state of the single-entity doctrine, support the conclusion that
no-poaching agreements in franchise systems operate in the same way as
agreements in unfranchised systems. Namely, no-poaching agreements in
franchises similarly stagnate wages and restrict worker mobility.228 Based
on the current state of the single-entity doctrine, this Part proposes that nopoaching agreements in the franchise sector should be considered per se
illegal. In other words, regardless of categorization, no-poaching agreements
should be banned entirely.
American Needle challenges the Copperweld229 analysis employed in
Williams and leaves the door open for litigation in the franchise sector.230
221. Id.; see also supra Parts II.B, III.B (using two case studies—one in the technology
industry and the other in the fast-food industry—to demonstrate the differences).
222. KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 13.
223. Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case, supra note 20.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See supra Parts II.B, III (comparing no-poaching agreements in unfranchised and
franchised systems).
229. See supra Part I.C. The Copperweld doctrine holds that a parent company and its
wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring because they share a community of
interests. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984). The NFL is an
example of a franchised enterprise that does not fall under the Copperweld doctrine. The NFL
was deemed to not be a single enterprise because it consisted of thirty-two teams that competed
with one another, were independently managed, and held separate economic power. See Am.
Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 201 (2010).
230. Davis, supra note 10, at 300 & n.137.
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The Supreme Court has defined single entities as a parent company together
with its wholly owned subsidiaries or, at a minimum, companies with “a
complete unity of interest.”231 Franchises, like NFL football teams, are fully
capable of conspiring with one another.232 Likewise, co-franchisees exist in
a competitive relationship with each other for some purposes, including the
hiring of employees.233 American Needle does not clarify whether Williams
remains good law after the Supreme Court narrowed the definition of a
“single economic entity,” which suggests that franchises may be viewed as
independent companies that can conspire in violation of the Sherman Act.234
The FTC and DOJ’s October 2016 guidance makes clear that companies
that “compete to hire or retain employees are competitors in the employment
marketplace, regardless of whether the firms make the same products or
compete to provide the same services.”235 It is therefore unlawful for
competitors to expressly or implicitly agree not to compete with one
another.236 As noted, individual franchises compete with one another both
for employees and customers.237 Following this line of analysis, economists
have proposed that no-poaching agreements be uniformly banned regardless
of whether they are used outside or within franchises.238 These proponents
believe that a per se approach is appropriate because a franchise model can
operate just as efficiently without imposing these types of hiring
restrictions.239 From an economic point of view, no-poaching agreements
violate section 1 of the Sherman Act regardless of the circumstances
surrounding their use.240 Much like the agreements the Silicon Valley
technology companies made, the no-poaching agreements in a franchise
system harm workers by restricting their mobility across the labor market and
preventing them from receiving higher wages and potentially better working
conditions.241 As such, a per se rule against these agreements is appropriate.
Plaintiffs in the foregoing class action franchise cases have relied on the
government’s October 2016 guidance242 in arguing in support of a per se
approach to no-poaching agreements.243 However, the DOJ recently stated
231. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771.
232. Marc Edelman, Why the “Single Entity” Defense Can Never Apply to NFL Clubs: A
Primer on Property-Rights Theory in Professional Sports, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 891, 893 (2008).
233. 3 ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 81, § 16:43.
234. See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 188; see also KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 11.
235. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, supra note 12, at 2.
236. Id.
237. See supra Parts I.C, III.A (describing competition broadly in the single-entity context
and also in the franchise context).
238. See KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 13.
239. See id.
240. Id.
241. Letter from Elizabeth Warren and Cory A. Booker to Jeff Sessions, supra note 14,
at 2; see supra Part II.B (discussing the In re High-Tech cases).
242. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, supra note 12.
243. Bryan Koenig, DOJ Gives Fast-Food Chains Ammo Against No-Poach Suits, LAW360
(Jan. 29, 2019, 9:11 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1123203 [https://perma.cc/7F6DJYBT].
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that it intends to intervene to clarify that its guidance is inapplicable to
franchise systems.244 By advocating for a stricter standard, the DOJ is
essentially countering the argument that franchise no-poaching agreements
are per se illegal.245 It must be noted, though, that the DOJ’s opinion is not
binding on the judges who decide which standard is most appropriate to
apply.246 The fate of these cases will turn on the facts specific to each case.247
If courts decide to forgo a per se application, they should, in the alternative,
employ a case-by-case heightened quick-look approach whereby they would
scrutinize these types of agreements and balance the justifications against the
harm to the employees. In many cases, especially in the fast-food industry,
the pro-competitive justifications do not outweigh the economic harm to
already low-income workers.248 Under this approach, courts should rule in
favor of the employees of these franchises given the broader economic and
public policy implications.249
CONCLUSION
The Court in American Needle did not provide a clear framework for courts
to use when dealing with the single-entity defense to liability under section 1
of the Sherman Act. While American Needle did not explicitly overrule the
Copperweld decision, it opened the door for litigation in the franchise
industry. Courts should use this period of evolution and uncertainty to set
out clear violations of no-poaching agreements in the franchise sector
because their effects are substantially similar to no-poaching agreements
between separate corporate entities. This Note advocates for a per se rule
against no-poaching agreements among franchisors and franchisees.

244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Bryan Koenig, Can No-Poach Class Actions Beat the Rule of Reason?, LAW360 (Jan.
30, 2019, 9:15 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1123789 [https://perma.cc/BNY6HL68].
248. See KRUEGER & POSNER, supra note 13, at 14 (addressing the issues specific to lowincome workers).
249. See supra Part III.D.2 (discussing, in detail, the economic and public policy
considerations).

